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Summary
In the recent years, a new battle against tax havens has emerged.
After decades with inefficient efforts, the number of tax information
treaties signed with tax havens suddenly skyrocketed after the finan-
cial crisis of 2007-08. This thesis investigates how this may have af-
fected the global hidden wealth and the use of tax havens. By applying
modern methods of estimation, both the total amount of unrecorded
assets and its allocation through the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 is calcu-
lated. By adding these estimates to an existing set covering 2001-2008,
the developments in the use of tax havens are investigated throughout
a crucial period of time. The analysis shows indications of a decline
in the relative amount of global hidden wealth, as well as some sig-
nificant changes in its allocation. While the three largest havens, Ire-
land, Luxembourg and Cayman Islands, appear little affected by the
last years’ developments, OECD-countries typically not known as tax
havens suffer a significant decline in their hosting of unrecorded as-
sets. In contrast, the United States and the United Kingdom, two of
the most outspoken opponents of tax haven practices, seem to experi-
ence an increase, while the effect on unrecorded asset holdings in tax
havens is more ambiguous. Further analysis on the causal effects of
tax treaties imply that tax havens may benefit of a shift towards more
legal, financial activity, as tax treaties appear to have a significant, pos-
itive effect on total asset holdings in treaty-signing havens.
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1 Introduction
“The magistrates are like sheriffs in the spaghetti westerns who watch
the bandits celebrate on the other side of the Rio Grande... They
taunt us - and there is nothing we can do.”
(Eva Joly, Tax Justice Network, 2013)
Following the globalization and increased mobility on capital, the number
of tax havens, popularly known as treasure islands, has increased dramatically
over the last few decades. Through secrecy and extremely low tax burdens,
they have attracted capital from all over the world, allowing large corporations
to pay practically no taxes at all, while accumulating frustration among the
countries watching their tax base shrink. In addition, tax havens are rumored
to create instability and uncertainty in the financial markets and to make illegal
money flows impossible to trace (NOU 2009).
For years, the offensive against tax haven was led by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), starting already in 1987
with the report "International Tax Avoidance and Evasion". The efforts proved
unsuccessful, and the apathetic view towards the problem, represented by the
quote above, has been prominent. At least until the financial crisis emerged in
2007. In the aftermath of this crisis, labeled “the largest financial shock since
the Great Depression” by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the situation
changed (Stewart 2008). Suddenly, the number of tax treaties increased dramat-
ically, the rhetoric sharpened and a new battle against tax havens took form.1
This is evident in Figure 1, which shows the number of Tax Information Ex-
change Agreements (TIEAs) signed by tax havens with both other havens and
non-haven countries, and the increase in signed agreements after 2008 is clearly
illustrated. For all the years examined in this thesis, TIEAs only provided for
the exchange of tax information on request relating to specific investigations of
civil tax matters, but was supplemented by an automatic process in 2014 (OECD
2015). While some scholars, like Ronen Palan et. al. (2010), argue that the sys-
tem of TIEAs has been time-consuming, expensive and wholly ineffective, em-
pirical research has shown that they do have some significant effects (Zucman
1This new offensive is often labeled the “G20 crackdown”, among others by Zucman and
Johannesen (2014). The OECD and the G20 works together closely on these issues. The cooper-
ation is perhaps best described with the OECD’s own words: “While the G20 has incentivised
changes in OECD standards and initiatives, the OECD has in turn helped push forward cutting-
edge issues on the G20 tax agenda” (OECD 2015a). Throughout this thesis, these combined
efforts is for simplicity mostly referred to as OECD efforts.
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Figure 1: The rush of treaties after the financial crisis
Source: Zucman and Johannesen (2014, p. 70)
and Johannesen 2014). Nevertheless, the striking increase in tax treaties is still
indicating a shift in behavior towards tax havens.
The OECD declared their victory only a few years later, through the report
“The Era of Bank Secrecy is Over”, presenting evidence of increased tax rev-
enues, improved fairness of the tax system and a changed attitude towards
facilitating evasion. However, despite its joyful title, the report still calls for
further action to unveil the “billions of dollars of undeclared assets” still hid-
den offshore (OECD 2011, p. 2).
In 2013, the United States reached another milestone by implementing their
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The act requires foreign finan-
cial institutions (FFIs) and other non-U.S. entities to automatically provide in-
formation about US persons who have direct or indirect interests in foreign fi-
nancial accounts. Those which do not comply, would be subject to US withhold-
ing taxes on their income. Shortly after this implementation, the EU’s biggest
countries, namely United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany and Italy, pro-
claimed that they not only wish to follow this act, but also work for a global
arrangement for information exchange. Such an agreement would, according
to the chairman of Tax Justice Norway, effectively mean the end of the world’s
tax havens (Spencer 2012; Jacobsen, 2013; Moscovici et. al. 2013).
To the best of my knowledge, few empirical studies have been done to in-
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vestigate the effects these efforts have had on hidden wealth. A few notable
exceptions are discussed in Section 2. This is partially explained by the lack
of data – the very nature of tax haven practices makes them hard to study. In
this thesis, I apply modern methods of estimation to produce figures of hidden
wealth for the years immediately after the financial crisis, namely 2009-2011. I
add these years to an existing set for 2001-2008, produced by Gabriel Zucman
(2013), yielding total time-series data on hidden wealth for years both before
and after the crisis (hence also the mass-signing of tax treaties). I try to ap-
proach three questions. First, how has the massive efforts against tax havens
affected the total amount of hidden wealth? Secondly, has the allocation of hid-
den wealth been affected? And lastly, how does these treaties affect asset hold-
ings in tax havens? I investigate these problems in Section 4, finding that the
absolute value of hidden wealth remains high, but the relative, growth-adjusted
numbers are decreasing. There are also changes in where the unrecorded assets
is located. While the biggest tax havens, Ireland, Luxembourg and Cayman Is-
lands, seem little affected by the battle surrounding them, other large European
economies suffer a significant decline in their hosting of unrecorded assets. At
the same time, both the United States and the United Kingdom, two of the most
outspoken opponents of tax haven practices, seem to experience an increase in
the wealth hidden within their own borders. As for the treaties’ direct effect, I
find that there are a significant, positive effect on asset holdings, including both
recorded and unrecorded assets, when a tax haven signs a TIEA. There could
be several reasons for this, which are thoroughly discussed in Subsection 4.3.
Until recent years, theoretical models have been the most used tools for anal-
yses of tax havens. Thus, before I get to the detailed empirical strategy in Sec-
tion 3, I will give a brief overview of the most prominent theoretical research
on tax havens.
2 Theoretical overview
A common perception, at least if you listen to politicians and activists, is that tax
havens are parasites in the global economy, feeding of other countries’ tax bases
to increase their own incomes. In theory, things are a bit more complicated.
In the following, I present different approaches to the theoretical studies of tax
havens, and show how different models can yield opposite implications of how
to perceive them. But first, let me define what a tax haven actually is.
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2.1 What is a tax haven?
Despite the title of this thesis, "treasure islands" is rather imprecise, and mostly
used in popular science. It is imprecise because, as this thesis clearly will
demonstrate, tax havens is not a group consisting only of small island states.
But also for the more technical terms, the definitions are quite vague and sub-
ject for discussion. First, there is some confusion connected to the definition of
a tax haven, and how the term differs from Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs)
and Preferential Tax Regimes (PTRs). While “OFC” can be described as a less
pejorative designation than “tax haven”, though in reality very similar, “PTR”
is commonly used to describe jurisdictions with a low tax burden, but not nec-
essarily secrecy (Palan et. al. 2010). The latter will not be used throughout this
thesis.
In 1998, the OECD developed four criteria for tax havens. These were (1)
No or only very low taxes; “the starting point to classify a jurisdiction as a tax
haven”, (2) lack of effective exchange of information; through “strict secrecy
rules and other protections against scrutiny by tax authorities”, (3) lack of trans-
parency “in the operation of the legislative, legal or administrative provisions”,
and (4) no substantial economic activities; which OECD states an important cri-
teria as it “suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract investment
or transactions that are purely tax driven” (OECD 1998, p 23). It is important
to note that the term “tax haven” implies more than just low tax rates; equally
important is secrecy. Thus Ronen Palan et. al. (2010) have offered an extended
version of OECDs list of criteria, to further distinguish tax havens from PTRs.
This definition states that tax havens are jurisdictions which deliberately facili-
tate transactions from individuals in other countries, with the purpose of avoid-
ing taxes and/or regulations. This is made possible through “a legally backed
veil of secrecy”. (Palan et. al. 2010, p. 45). Unless stated otherwise, this ex-
tended definition is used throughout this thesis.
It is a difficult task to identify an actual country as a tax haven, as the clas-
sification above inevitably must involve some degree of subjectivity. Accord-
ing to Dharmapala and Hines (2009, p. 1065), tax havens are small countries,
and they have high quality governance institutions - poorly governed coun-
tries “virtually never appear as tax havens”. Another commonly used source is
Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index (FSI). As the name implies, this
rating is based on the secrecy part alone. Here, as in Dharmapala and Hines
(2009), assumed well-governed countries dominate the upper part of the rank-
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ing. Some of them are also small, like Luxembourg (2nd), Hong Kong (3rd) and
Cayman Island (4th), but some stand out as quite the contrary: They are huge.
Note for instance USA (6th), Germany (8th) and Japan (10th) (FSI 2013). This is
important to have in mind; tax havens are not necessarily remote island states.2
A categorization of tax havens is used for practical purposes in the empir-
ical section, and an actual sorting is needed. I thus categorize countries as tax
havens according to IMFs (2000) list of OFCs, ignoring the theoretical difference
between the two terms. This list includes 42 countries, and is the very same cat-
egorization as Gabriel Zucman (2013; 2014) uses in his empirical work, which I
will return to below.3
2.2 Modeling tax havens
Intuitively, it makes perfect sense that non-haven countries are trying to pre-
vent tax havens from operating: The tax havens facilitate tax avoidance, which
directly causes less tax revenue for non-havens. However, to fully understand
how - and through which channels - tax havens are harmful, Joel Slemrod and
John D. Wilson (2009) have extended a simple tax competition framework to
include havens. Their model has been widely cited and, especially in terms
of their conclusions, it might be considered a benchmark model for tax haven
modeling.
In the model, we look at an economy with a large number of countries. The
agents of this economy have preferences over private and public consumption
that can be represented by the utility function u(x, g), which is increasing and
concave in the arguments x; private consumption, and g; a publicly provided
good.
The firms pay a tax rate t and decide whether to shift their income to tax
havens. Firms are identical with one exception; the cost of participating in a
tax haven, θ. This parameter captures “the legal and accounting fees needed
to research the relevant tax laws, research the available tax havens, and imple-
ment the chosen income-shifting strategy" (Slemrod and Wilson 2009, p. 1263).
2City of London and the American states Nevada and Delaware are for instance frequently
described as important havens
3The 42 countries are Dublin (Ireland), Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lux-
embourg, Singapore, Switzerland, Andorra, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Labuan
(Malaysia), Macao, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Is-
lands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, and Vanuatu (IMF 2000,
table 2)
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The firms also face a unit price, p, of concealment services c offered by the tax
havens.4 The firms decide the amount of concealing services to buy, taking two
things into account: The price p and the amount of money, s(c, b), possible to
shield from taxes. It is assumed that s(c, b) is increasing and strictly concave
in c, and declining and convex in b, which represents the governments enforce-
ment expenditures per unit of capital.5
Eventually, and I refer to Slemrod and Wilson’s (2009) original article for
further details of solving the model, the optimality conditions for the firms be-
comes
t
∂s
∂c
= p. (1)
In words, the firms choose c such that the potential gains from increasing s
through buying one more unit of c, is equal to the price of c. Their participation
in tax havens is determined by the cost θ and the gains, denoted Θ:
Θ = ts(c, b)− pc. (2)
All firms with θ < Θ participates in a haven, while firms with θ ≥ Θ do not.
After solving the model, Slemrod and Wilson (2009) arrive at the following
optimality condition for the government:
ug
ux
=
1 + DT
1− TRε(1 + DT)
≡ MC. (3)
Where DT is the derivative of D(r, T, b, p), which denotes the social cost of
capital taxation per unit of capital.6 DT is assumed positive.
With this condition in hand, we can show that an elimination of tax havens
would leave the non-haven countries better off, which is the first proposition
in Slemrod and Wilson’s (2009) paper. They argue that welfare increases for
two reasons: (1) The resources previously used to pay for concealment services
can now be used productively, and (2) the marginal cost for the public good
provision declines, inducing an increase in the countries’ level of public good.
They prove this by stating that the factor prices R and W(R) remain unaffected,
while the private consumption x increases due to the efficiency gains. With x
rising, the marginal benefit of the normal good g rises, while the marginal cost
4 p is assumed to be an increasing function of the worldwide purchases of concealment ser-
vices, C
5We also assume s(0, b) = 0, 1 > s(c, b) > 0 for all positive c and ∂
2s
∂c∂b < 0.
6r denotes the firm’s expected income and T denotes the effective tax rate (Slemrod and
Wilson 2009).
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declines as DT can be eliminated from (3), yielding
ug
ux
=
1
1− TRε
≡ MC′. (4)
In this new situation, the marginal benefit of g exceeds the marginal cost. Thus,
equilibrium will be restored with a higher level of g (in every country).
A complete elimination of all havens, however, is rather unrealistic, at least
in the short run. This statement will be backed up in the empirical part of the
thesis. Fortunately, Slemrod and Wilson address also the partial elimination of
havens. In their second proposition, they state that “a reduction in the number
of havens causes all countries to increase their public good provision. Provided
that tax competition leads to under-provision of the public good, this reduction
must raise welfare" (Slemrod and Wilson 2009, p. 1266).
To prove this, they manipulate the income shifting function s(c, b) a bit, and
wind up with a income shifting function s(c/B) which is homogeneous of de-
gree zero in both c and B.7
The first order condition of a firm’s optimal choice of c – recall Equation (1)
– thus becomes:
t
∂s
∂(c/B)
= pB (5)
A critical assumption in Slemrod and Wilson’s (2009) paper is that a reduc-
tion in the supply of concealment services leads to a higher equilibrium price
p, that is, the supply curve is upward-sloping. Taking the above equation into
account, this increase in p due to a decrease in the number of operating havens,
makes it possible for the governments to spend less on enforcement, b, and
more on public good provision, without stimulating more income shifting by
the firms. To be able to conclude that this increases welfare, we must assume
that the public good is under-provided when tax havens are operating, so that
the public good provision do not get inefficiently high (Slemrod and Wilson
2009).8
The model is quite clear. Under a certain set of assumptions, both a total
and partial elimination of tax havens increases welfare for non-haven coun-
tries. These propositions hold, with a few minor modifications not particularly
7The added assumptions and manipulations are: (1) Assume that s(c, b) can be written as
s(c/(γ + b), (2) add restrictions s(0) = 0, s′(.) > 0, (3) γ ≥ 0 and (4) define B = γ + b
8The three conditions stated in Proposition 2 are: Homogeneous income-shifting function,
b > 0 and under-provision of the public good.
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relevant for this thesis, true also when the number of havens is endogenously
determined, which Slemrod and Wilson (2009) prove in the last part of their
paper. Especially one key point is worth noting: The higher the population of a
country, the higher concealment price p is required for that country to become a
tax haven. This implies that in the case of partial elimination of tax havens, the
largest havens will give up their practice because of a higher p (this also applies
for any rise in p, no matter the cause). As I will return to later in the thesis, it is
difficult to support this predicted turn of events empirically.
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) represent what Dhammika Dharmapala (2008,
p. 662) describes as a “traditional ’negative’ view of tax havens”. Scholars
like Qing Hong and Michael Smart (2009) represent the opposite. They praise
the tax havens, arguing that income shifting and tax planning also may reduce
the tax burdens on mobile capital and facilitate investment. Particularly the
fourth proposition in their paper stands out in contrast to Slemrod and Wilson’s
(2009) analysis, as Hong and Smart (2009, p. 90) claim that “an increase in
international tax planning (...) causes social welfare to rise”.
Hong and Smart, among others, represent what Dharmapala labels “the
emerging ’positive’ view of havens”. The main point in this research is that
tax havens enable high-tax countries to impose lower effective tax rates on mo-
bile firms, while still imposing a relatively high rate on immobile firms. Thus,
the existence of tax havens can enhance efficiency and mitigate tax competition,
and, consequently, fears of a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates could
be misplaced (Dharmapala p. 662; Hong Smart p. 82).
Some empirical data lend support to the latter view. Despite substantial for-
eign direct investment (FDI) flows to tax havens, corporate tax revenue in the
US, the UK, and other countries has actually increased, not fallen. The “gener-
ally robust” growth of corporate tax revenues, which OECD (2011) also points
out clearly, thus suggests that the concerns expressed about the damaging ef-
fects may be exaggerated (Dharmapala 2008, p. 662).
2.3 Applying the model to recent events
There is no doubt, however, that tax havens are treated as hostiles by OECD
and other non-haven countries. I will now return to the model developed by
Slemrod and Wilson (2009), where tax havens are definitely harmful to other
countries’ welfare, and try to fit the recent developments into its framework.
Here, the non-havens are better off without the havens, and they are better
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off if some of them disappear. The partial elimination is treated as something
exogenous, although the OECD efforts often is referred to as a fight to eliminate
the tax havens.9 In this model, even with endogenous tax haven activity, the
governments have no means to affect the unit price p, which is the determining
factor if a country decides to engage in tax haven activities. However, the fight
is not against tax havens per se, but against tax evasion.
The 2009-2011 rush of bilateral tax exchange treaties (recall Figure 1) can,
and should, be interpreted as a series of efforts made by the non-haven coun-
tries. This is captured by an increase in b in Slemrod and Wilson’s (2009) model.
There is no corresponding increase in tax rates t to my knowledge, so in this
simple framework the increased b will lead to an immediate welfare loss. If we
look at several periods, it could still be a rational move.
The objective of the governments is to stop firms from participating in tax
havens. Recall the participation condition, Equation (2):
θ < ts(c, b)− pc = Θ
As the countries have no power to influence p directly, they have two op-
tions to shift incentives: Decrease t or increase b (which will decrease s(c, b),
as this function is declining and convex in b). Taking the enormous increase
in treaties (and sharpened rhetoric, I might add) into account, it is reasonable
to interpret the efforts over the past few years as the latter. Strictly speaking,
however, I would find it even more reasonable to interpret this as an increase in
the initial costθ, that is, redefine this to a function of b. θ is to be interpreted “as
the legal and accounting fees needed to research the relevant tax laws, research
the available tax havens, and implement the chosen income-shifting strategy”
(Slemrod and Wilson 2009, p. 1263). I would expect that the mass-signing of
tax treaties forces the firms to create new income-shifting strategies, where they
shift away from treaty-signing havens. This assumption has support in the em-
pirical data, which I will discuss more thoroughly in Section 2.5. After this is
new strategy is implemented, they should be able to hide away as much income
as before, assuming that all havens offer somewhat equal terms. As s(c, b) de-
notes the share of income possible to hide from taxes, I find an increase in θ
as a more realistic effect. However, I proceed in interpreting the efforts as an
increase in b, as θ is exogenous in this particular model.
9See for instance president Francois Hollande’s call for "eradication" of tax havens, as re-
ferred to by BBC, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22094194
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Now, the decreased s(c, b) contributes to a smaller benefit from participating
in a haven, Θ. The only counter-measure to be taken by the firms is to increase
purchases of c, but according to the optimality condition for the firms, Equation
(5), where the term ∂s∂(c/B) will lead to an increase in the left hand side, and B
will lead to an increase in the right hand side, it is hard to tell how exactly the
firms will adjust. Thus, I assume c is not significantly changed.
In the end, what determines whether the efforts are successful, is the value
of the parameters and the elasticity of s(c, b) with regards to b. Still, if the in-
crease in b is sufficiently large, θ will eventually become larger than Θ, and
firms will change their strategy into not evading taxes. Then, a sufficiently
large share of the firms have to start paying their taxes to compensate for the
loss in welfare due to the increased b. In a long run perspective, it could be
possible to gain from inducing anti-haven efforts.
2.4 Eliminating the havens
So far, we have dealt with models estimating the welfare effects of tax havens.
May Elsayyad and Kai A. Konrad (2012) address the process of eliminating
them. They set up a simplified game with three players: Two havens Hi and
one large non-haven S, possibly representing a larger group, like the OECD.
Albeit simplified, the game played yields quite clear policy implications. One
important take-away is that in a sequential fight against tax havens, the first
ones are the easiest to eliminate. This is because the competition among the
remaining havens eases as other havens close down, thus giving the remaining
havens the opportunity to increase their prices on concealment services. Ulti-
mately, if all but one haven are eradicated, it could be nearly impossible, or at
least very expensive, to convince the last, monopolistic haven to quit. In short:
Initial success don’t necessarily mean it will end successfully.
The second important point from this model, is that closure of a few havens
may lead to a situation which is worse than the initial situation with a high
number of active havens. The reasoning is somewhat similar as the first point:
Few havens mean less competition, less competition means higher unit price
for concealment services. Thus, argues the authors, tax revenues in the non-
havens remain low, while a large share of the capital returns is allocated to
the tax havens (Elsayyad and Konrad 2012). Here, the model differs from the
Slemrod and Wilson (2009) model, where higher price of concealment would
decrease demand and possibly stop havens from evading taxes. An alterna-
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tive interpretation is that Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) consider the benefits of
evading so high that the firms still gain from using tax havens after a significant
increase in the unit price. In the framework of Slemrod and Wilson (2009), this
is assuming a large gap betweenθ and Θ = ts− pc, which will not be equalized
by an increase in p. With this assumption, Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) do not
have to focus on the decision-making by firms, and the demand for conceal-
ment services will always be high. In this framework, in contrast to Slemrod
and Wilson (2009), the countries must focus on removing tax havens, not on
shifting incentives for the tax-avoiding firms.
2.5 Introducing empirics
As seen, there is a relatively wide range of theories of the tax havens’ impact
on the global economy generally and non-haven countries specifically. In the
recent years, these matters have also been studied more extensively empirically.
Two of the pioneers in this new approach are Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria
Milesi-Ferretti. In 2001, they constructed estimates of foreign assets and liabil-
ities for 67 countries - stocks that one knew “surprisingly little” about at the
time. The dataset created (EWNI) was described by the authors as “an initial
step in investigating the determinants of countries’ external wealth”, and it has
been continuously updated (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), p. 263 and 290).
In 2007, the second, revised and significantly extended version of the dataset,
abbreviated EWNII, was published. Gabriel Zucman (2013) built further upon
this work, when he (mainly) used the aggregate liabilities estimated in EWNII
to map the total amount of global missing wealth.10 By estimating the total hid-
den wealth and applying this to global statistics, he shows that the eurozone,
officially the world’s second largest net debtor, is actually a net creditor, while
the United States has a lot smaller debt burden than reported. In other words,
he proves that unrecorded assets cause severe bias in international statistics
and hence he emphasizes the importance of unveiling the global hidden wealth
(Zucman 2013). What he does not do, is to look at the developments in hidden
wealth and its allocation over the years. In the latter part of this thesis, I adopt
Zucman’s methods to estimate hidden wealth for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011,
aiming to do just that.
While the OECD has expressed great optimism, to say the least, regarding
the fight against tax havens, Gabriel Zucman and Niels Johannesen (2014) re-
10His methods will be thoroughly discussed in the next section
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cently published research that tells an entirely different story. By using undis-
closed, bilateral data on bank deposits from the Bank of International Settle-
ments (BIS), they show that bilateral information exchange treaties have a sig-
nificant negative effect on bank deposits. In particular: A non-haven’s savings
in a tax haven decrease with 11.5 percent relative to all non-haven’s deposits
in tax havens when a treaty is signed. Further, Zucman and Johannesen (2014)
extend their analysis and run a number of robustness tests, ending up suggest-
ing that at this point, tax treaties have only caused relocation of bank deposits
between tax havens, not triggering significant repatriations of funds. Their re-
sults are in line with the assumptions in Elsayyad and Konrad’s (2012) model of
tax haven elimination – if a tax haven signs a treaty which could reveal hidden
wealth, capital owners relocate their money to a tax haven who has not signed
a similar treaty.
A joint implication from Zucman and Johannesen’s (2014) empirical work
and Elsayyad and Konrad’s (2012) theoretical work, is that we can not expect
any decline in the total hidden wealth, despite the increasing efforts and that
tax treaties evidently have a desired effect on tax evaders.11 In the following
section, I address this very question and investigate if we can find a similar ef-
fect on asset holdings as Zucman and Johannesen (2014) find on bank deposits.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Main objective
In the existing research, total hidden wealth until 2008 and bank deposits in
a selection of tax havens until 2012 is mapped and discussed. In this section,
I create a complete dataset on bilateral holdings of assets, from 2001 to 2011,
and use this to estimate hidden wealth in terms of unrecorded assets. I expand
Gabriel Zucman’s (2013) dataset by nearly 40 percent, gaining a total of twenty-
two 241 x 241 matrices over bilateral debt and equity holdings.12 As I construct
six matrices on my own, and add them to the 16 created by Zucman, I strive
to proceed exactly like he did to preserve internal consistency in the set of es-
timates. The main data source is the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
11Tax evaders apparently relocate their money away from treaty-signing tax havens, which is
exactly what the treaty is designed to cause. Thus, in a hypothetical scenario where all country-
pairs have signed tax treaties, tax evading would not be possible.
12For the last three years, the matrices are 243 x 243, because of Kosovo and South Sudan’s
gained independence.
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(CPIS), conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which collects
holdings of debt and equity assets from 74 participating countries, in up to 243
host countries. The survey data is not flawless, however, so it is necessary to
do a few adjustments. I will account for them below, and extensively in Section
A.2 in the appendix.
The aim with this procedure is to see if there has been any developments in
the amount of hidden wealth, as well as to identify possible shifts in where the
hidden wealth is located. As the number of treaties has skyrocketed after the
financial crisis, this complete overview could give key insights to whether they
have had any effect.
To estimate the total hidden wealth, I start with the reported bilateral hold-
ings of equities and debt, denoted Ei j and Di j. For a lot of countries these data
are missing. I estimate and make a few manual corrections to fill in the gaps,
and get a complete set of Eˆi j and Dˆi j. The sum of these,
∑
i
∑
i 6= j
[Eˆi j + Dˆi j] =∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Aˆi j (6)
denotes all assets reportedly held by all countries, i. To get an estimate of the
missing wealth, that is, the unrecorded assets, I subtract this sum from the sum
of all liabilities in host countries j, individually denoted Lˆ j. The latter is mainly
collected from the updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Na-
tions data set (EWNII) constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), but I pro-
vide certain additions for missing countries. Unfortunately, there is no bilateral
breakdown of liabilities. That means we can not derive how much wealth is
hidden away by each country. The opposite is possible, however – we can es-
timate how much hidden wealth is located in each country. In a given year, I
estimate the unrecorded assets located in country j, denoted Ω j, by calculating
Lˆ j −∑
i 6= j
Aˆi j = Ω j. (7)
The total sum of unrecorded assets, denoted Ω follows as
∑
j
Lˆ j −∑
i
∑
j 6=i
Aˆi j = Ω. (8)
In the following of this section, I will specify the regression model used to
calculate Aˆi j, as well as present and discuss my various data sources used to
improve estimations of both Aˆi j and Lˆ j. For simplicity, I denote Aˆi = ∑ j Aˆi j,
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Eˆi = ∑ j Eˆi j and Dˆi = ∑ j Dˆi j, where Eˆi + Dˆi = Aˆi.
3.2 Asset data
3.2.1 The Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and the gravity-
like model
The CPIS has been conducted yearly since 2001 (twice per year since 2013), and
the purpose is to “improve statistics of holdings of portfolio investment assets
in the form of equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt” (CPIS Guide, p. 1).
It consists of 75 countries’ reported holdings of equity and debt assets in (up to)
243 host countries. The survey treats offshore territories, like the havens Jersey,
Guernsey and Netherlands Antilles, as separate countries.
These data are freely available from IMF’s database. I use the following
empirical specification adopted from Zucman (2013) to estimate the linear re-
gression parameters explaining the bilateral asset holdings:
log(1 + Ai jt) = φ j +θt +βZi jt +γXit +εi jt (9)
where φ j denotes host-country fixed effects, θt denotes year fixed effects, Zi jt
denotes a vector of bilateral control variables and Xit denotes a vector of source-
country control variables.
I collect data from the World Bank and Zucman’s dataset (2013), and include
the following control variables in the bilateral control vector Zi jt:
Zi jt = [ log(Distance)i j, log(GDP gap)i jt, (GDP per capita gap)i jt, (Longitude gap)i j,
(Common language)i j, (Colonial relationship)i j, (Both countries industrial)i j,
OFCi ×φ j ]
As the values we want to predict is source-country data, only year fixed effects
and host country fixed effects is included. If we were to use source country
fixed effects, they would absorb all the source-country variation, and our esti-
mates would be biased (Lane and Shambaugh 2010). Instead, I include the fol-
lowing source-level controls, collected from World Bank data (WDI 2015) and
Gabriel Zucman (2013):
Xit = [ Populationit, Latitudei, GDP per capitait, Landlockedi, OFCi ].
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As I use host country fixed effects, all variation from similar host country con-
trols is already captured by the model.
This model has previously been used by several scholars to estimate CPIS
data. It was first used by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and later modified and
used by Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and Gabriel Zucman (2013), from which
the notation is taken. As I will discuss later, the model has a high explanatory
power: The R2-value is around 0,7, which is “high enough to generate sensible
predicted values”, according to Lane and Slambaugh (2010, p 118).
I proceed like Zucman (2013), by collecting observables and predicting the
missing values of Eˆi j and Dˆi j using the estimated coefficients from the empirical
specification outlined in Equation (9). From these predicted values, I calculate
the share of each host country j in each source country i’s portfolio, denoted σˆi j,
which equals
Aˆi j
∑ j Aˆi j
. I do this separately for equity and debt assets, yielding σˆEi j
for equities and σˆDi j for debt.
For the countries participating in the CPIS, I use the reported values Di j and
Ei j without adjustments, except in the cases of Netherlands and Cayman Is-
lands, which I will account for below. For other countries, I collect information
about the true values of each source-country’s total asset holdings, Ei and Di,
or at least Ai when a debt/equity breakdown is not available. Next, I adjust
Eˆi j and Dˆi j to match what we know about the true values of Ei and Di. The
procedure is as follows:
For countries not participating in the CPIS, I collect the value of the total
investments Eˆi and Dˆi from the EWNII dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) and distribute the sum over the various host countries j using
the calculated shares σˆEi j and σˆ
D
i j . Where only Aˆi is available, I estimate the
country’s debt/equity ratio using the estimated values, and then distribute the
resulting estimates Eˆi and Dˆi like the previous case. Where no reliable Aˆi is
available, I estimate it by first computing i’s holdings of US securities using the
Treasury International Capital (TIC) survey of US portfolio liabilities, before
using the shares of US in i’s portfolio, σˆEi,US and σˆ
D
i,US, to obtain Eˆi and Dˆi. From
there I follow the same routine by distributing these estimated total portfolio
holdings across host-countries using the predicted shares.
This method is only suitable when most assets are privately held. In the
opposite case, where the majority of foreign securities are publicly held, the
method cannot be applied, because public investment patterns differ signifi-
cantly from private patterns (Zucman 2013). This is the case for China and
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Middle Eastern oil exporters, for which I have to compute estimated asset hold-
ings separately. I explain the procedures for these calculations carefully in the
appendix.
The Cayman Islands and Netherlands do report to the CPIS, but with known
flaws in the figures. While Cayman Islands excludes their enormous fund sec-
tor, Netherlands do not include their Special Financial Institutions (SFIs), which
account for asset holdings to a significant extent. This, along with a few other
adjustments, is also thoroughly explained in the appendix. These discussions
and calculations, however, is not of secondary importance, but they are dele-
gated to the appendix to improve the reading flow, as they are rather detailed
and extensive.
In every analysis with a high degree of estimation there are some uncertain-
ties. The method I have adopted from Gabriel Zucman is “indirect and relies
on data with known imperfections”, and is indeed subject to a certain margin
of error (Zucman 2013, p 1324). The results in this thesis must therefore be in-
terpreted as results in the framework of Zucman’s method, but I will not repeat
his robustness and consistency checks. For a mere discussion of these topics, I
refer the reader to Section V in his article (2013).
For the possible inconsistencies which are unique in my dataset, I must take
precautions. Thus, before I complete the calculations of hidden wealth, I run a
benchmark regression to control for possible bias caused by the financial crisis
and a possible shift in investment behavior.
3.2.2 Benchmark regression and comparison of periods
The topic of the financial crisis and its possible effect on international invest-
ments has been studied by, among others, Kathleen M. Kahle and René M. Stulz
(2013), and there seems to be no doubt that the crisis caused a decline in corpo-
rate borrowing and capital expenditure and sparked counter-measures by firms
(Kahle and Stulz, 2013; Campello et. al. 2011). What I am interested in, is if, and
in that case why, the crisis has caused a change in international investment be-
havior. If, for instance, Norwegian asset holders were strictly cost-minimizing
before the crisis, but were somewhat shocked by the crisis, and suddenly puts
more weight on neighboring countries (which they might trust more), relative
to distant countries, when they choose their investments. In other words: If
the gravity-like regression model fits well over all 11 years, or if I should apply
some sort of regression discontinuity design. According to Arvid O.I. Hoff-
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mann, Thomas Post and Joost M.E. Pennings (2013), investors’ behavior did
indeed change during the 2008-2009 financial crisis:
Investor perceptions exhibit significant fluctuation over the course of the
crisis, with risk tolerance and risk perceptions being less volatile than re-
turn expectations. In the worst months of the crisis, investors’ return ex-
pectations and risk tolerance decrease, while their risk perceptions increase.
(...) We find substantial swings in trading and risk-taking behavior during
the crisis that are driven by changes in investor perceptions.
(Hoffmann et. al. 2013, p. 72)
It is not as clear how this change could have affected asset holdings over time,
but the authors does point out that “return expectations, risk tolerance, and risk
perceptions recover” towards the end of the crisis, implying that no permanent
change in the pattern of asset holdings has occurred (Hoffmann et. al. 2013, p.
72). Also, any linear variation, for instance a 10 % decrease in short term debt
holdings, is captured by the time fixed effects, and the GDP control variables
should capture the variation caused by how severely the different economies
were affected by the crisis. Still, to check for inconsistencies, I start by running a
benchmark regression, excluding OFCs, and compare the coefficients (reported
in Table 1). I run the regression separately on the periods 2009-2011 (columns 1
and 2) , 2001-2008 (columns 3 and 4) and 2001-2011 (columns 5 and 6) .
I find that there are some differences between the sets. The "latitude of
source country"-variable, most significantly, changes sign for equities. This im-
plies that the further north a country is located, the higher is its equity holdings
in the period 2009-2011, in contrast to 2001-2008, where the opposite apparently
was the case. When including all periods, the coefficient is also negative, illus-
trating my concern very clearly: If the true value of the coefficient is positive
for 2009-2011, the predicted values for these years will be biased when they are
based on a regression over the entire period. The same logic applies to other
variables where the coefficients are varying across the different regressions.
Overall, however, things do not look so alarming. When tested, over 50
percent of the coefficients in the 2001-2011 regression are not significantly dif-
ferent (at the 1 % level) from the corresponding coefficients in the 2001-2008 and
2009-2011 regressions. I get this result by performing Wald tests on the 2001-
2011-coefficients, comparing them to the exact value on the coefficients from
the period-specific regressions. I do not include the standard errors of the coef-
ficients in the period-specific regressions, which could cause some significantly
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not different coefficients to appear significantly different, but not the other way
around. The full set of p-values are reported in Section A.1 the appendix, Table
3.
The different regressions all have high explanatory power, with R2-values
spanning from 0.702 to 0.739. Also, the final output, that is the estimates on hid-
den wealth, for the years 2001-2008 are very similar to Gabriel Zucman’s (2013)
estimates, regardless of which periods I use as source data for the predictions.
All in all, I do not consider the implications above as sufficient evidence of a
significant and permanent change in the investment behavior after the financial
crisis, at least not enough to cause any non-negligible bias in my final output. I
proceed by predicting missing values from the entire 2001-2011 set, but I leave
(Longitude gap)i j out, as the coefficient has the wrong sign.13
13This is also consistent with Zucman (2013).
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Table 1: Benchmark regression
2009-2011 2001-2008 2001-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log equities Log debt Log equities Log debt Log equities Log debt
Log distance -0.621∗∗∗ -0.850∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗
(-24.63) (-33.55) (-33.76) (-41.46) (-41.62) (-52.90)
Longitude gap 0.00473∗∗∗ 0.00394∗∗∗ 0.00338∗∗∗ 0.00294∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗∗ 0.00320∗∗∗
(12.11) (10.22) (13.17) (10.78) (17.76) (14.31)
Common language 0.677∗∗∗ 0.0301 0.394∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ -0.0692∗
(13.59) (0.59) (13.27) (-3.49) (18.30) (-2.55)
Colony dummy 0.681∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗
(7.32) (7.13) (4.53) (7.44) (8.02) (10.15)
Industrial pair dummy 2.741∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗ 2.739∗∗∗ 2.806∗∗∗ 2.762∗∗∗ 2.752∗∗∗
(43.68) (40.62) (63.16) (61.20) (77.48) (73.54)
Log of GDP gap -0.287∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(-23.72) (-12.55) (-33.57) (-16.57) (-40.20) (-20.79)
Log of GDP p.c. gap -0.197∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(-14.60) (-12.14) (-27.28) (-15.43) (-30.23) (-19.25)
Latitude of source country 0.00230∗∗∗ 0.000608 -0.00251∗∗∗ -0.00296∗∗∗ -0.00109∗∗∗ -0.00174∗∗∗
(4.63) (1.23) (-7.78) (-8.62) (-4.05) (-6.19)
Source country landlocked -0.0136 0.294∗∗∗ -0.0870∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ -0.0695∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(-0.40) (8.30) (-3.61) (8.11) (-3.52) (10.88)
Log of source country population 0.451∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(35.90) (37.10) (52.63) (49.64) (62.26) (61.33)
Log of source country GDP p.c. 1.136∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(54.18) (49.35) (74.35) (61.03) (90.70) (77.95)
Constant term -2.110∗∗∗ -1.232∗∗ -1.505∗∗∗ -3.519∗∗∗ -1.722∗∗∗ -1.314∗∗∗
(-5.79) (-2.75) (-8.02) (-18.32) (-5.79) (-4.41)
Observations 16045 17629 33746 34037 49785 51658
R2 0.709 0.705 0.735 0.741 0.723 0.725
Adjusted R2 0.706 0.702 0.734 0.739 0.722 0.724
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(1) and (2): 2009-2011: My own collection of data
(3) and (4): 2001-2008: Gabriel Zucman’s data
(5) and (6): Full set, 2001-2011: Both datasets combined
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3.3 Liability data
While the procedure for asset data is quite complicated, things are easier for lia-
bilites. Just like with the assets, I proceed similarly to Zucman (2013). The main
source is the updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations
(EWNII) dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The database
contains data for 188 countries, from 1970 to 2011. I take the values for total lia-
bilites, L j, directly from the EWNII-set, using its estimates on “Portfolio equity
liabilites” and “Portfolio debt liabilities”. As no bilateral data on liabilities is
available, there is no distribution across host countries.
The EWNII-set is extensive, but there is still a few gaps left to fill in – mostly
small offshore financial centers. I provide a brief overview of the corrections
made in the appendix, but in contrast to the asset side, very few deviations
from Gabriel Zucman’s procedure is made.14
4 Results and Discussion
In this section I present my estimates of hidden wealth. I compute total amount
of unrecorded assets, Ω, as the aggregate of unrecorded equity assets, ΩE, and
unrecorded debt assets, ΩD. Full bilateral breakdowns of both debt and equi-
ties, are attached in the appendix’ Section A.5, Table 6 and Table 7. The esti-
mates on unrecorded assets should be interpreted as assets with no reported
owners, and technically, if a country is estimated to host a large amount of un-
recorded assets, it does not necessarily mean that the money is located in that
country, as the funds could be reinvested. Hence, some unrecorded assets are
estimated to be in the country where their owners no longer were traceable. In
this thesis, however, it is of secondary importance where the actual money is, as
the main point is to identify the countries which make the assets unrecordable
and not subject for taxation.
As with all estimations, my calculations are subject to a certain degree of
uncertainty; asset holdings may be underreported, liabilities could be overes-
timated. Especially for international organizations, which hosts a huge nega-
tive amount of unrecorded assets, the figures look strange. This could mean
that some of the claims on international organizations are wrong, and should
be accounted as asset holdings in another country with positive numbers for
unrecorded assets. There could be various reasons for this; countries may be
14Again, I refer the reader to Zucman’s online appendix (section B, pages 36-50) for details.
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more sloppy when reporting assets to organizations, or it is the result of com-
plex ownership structures. Either way, I address this by including the negative
numbers when summarizing unrecorded assets, thus controlling for misplaced
claims globally.
4.1 Developments in total hidden wealth
In the OECD report “The Era of Bank Secrecy is Over”, it refers to an increase
in tax revenue of 14 billion euros and states that “there is far more to come”, im-
plicitly concluding that the measures taken over the previous years have been
successful (OECD 2011, p 2). Looking at the estimated values for Ω, there are
certain implications that give reasons for further optimism.
The total amount of unrecorded asset holdings, that is, the gap between all
assets and liabilities Lˆtotal − Aˆtotal, has fluctuated some after it’s peak in 2007,
but has been pretty stable well below the 2007 figure of $5.3 trillion. Still, there
is no clear trend in the absolute data indicating any significant decline, espe-
cially not if we treat 2007 as an out-lier. If anything, the trend seems to be
increasing over the entire period, stabilizing at a high level in the latter years.
The total sum of unrecorded assets in 2011 amounted to $4.5 trillion, of which
$3.0 trillion were located in tax havens, as illustrated in Figure 2. If we assume
that securities only account for 75% of household’s total offshore wealth (the
remaining 25% are bank deposits), as Gabriel Zucman (2013) does, the rough
estimate of total offshore wealth in 2011 amounts to $6 trillion, of which $4 tril-
lion is located in tax havens. This is to be considered rather conservative, at
least compared to figures such as Tax Justice Network’s “$7.3 to $9.3 trillion”-
estimate from 2012 (Henry 2012, p 5). Still, in absolute terms, there is no clear
evidence backing up OECD’s claims of an ending bank secrecy-era.
If we look at growth-adjusted numbers, however, things get a bit more opti-
mistic from OECD’s point of view. In 2008, unrecorded assets represented 7.1%
of the total global gross domestic product (GDP), after dropping down from
9.3% in 2007. Later, it first increased slightly to 7.7% in 2009, before decreasing
again to 6.4% in 2010 and 6.2% in 2011 - completing a quite significant negative
trend over the last four years in the sample (see Figure 3). The variation may
be a little biased by the fact that the financial market data seem to have been af-
fected by the crisis earlier than the GDP figures. For the latter, the crisis makes
its mark on GDP figures for 2009, while capital expenditures fell sharply imme-
diately during the crisis, causing a drop in asset holdings figures for year-end
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Figure 2: Total unrecorded assets Ω, 2001-2011
2008 (Kahle and Stulz 2013). To investigate this just a little bit further, I calculate
the share of year-end unrecorded assets in the next year’s world GDP, yielding
more smooth negative trend from 2007 to 2010, but a slight increase in the last
period. However, the overall trend seems to be more or less similar (see Figure
9 in the appendix’ Section A.4).
Either way, the total amount of hidden wealth is still huge, and the “era of
bank secrecy” is certainly not over yet. When adding bank deposits, wealth
worth over 8% of the total global GDP went unrecorded in 2011. To put this
into context: 8% of the global GDP is roughly similar to the size of the entire
Japanese economy (measured by GDP), and while the research may differ on
the total beneficial effects of tax havens, this undoubtedly represent a severe
erosion of countries’ tax bases. Further, the wealth is not likely to be uniformly
owned by the entire world’s population. On the contrary, James S. Henry (2012)
estimates that less than 100 000 people controls over 30 percent of the total fi-
nancial wealth. Applying this to the hidden wealth figures, I get that 0,001 % of
the world’s population controls hidden wealth similar to the size of Canada’s
GDP. As these holdings go unrecorded, the (now-so-famous) global inequality
is likely to be underestimated. According to Nicholas Shaxson, John Chris-
tensen and Nick Mathiason (2012, p 6), hidden wealth of this size would have
“a major impact on the Gini coefficient for each country”, and James S. Henry
adds that this conclusion also applies to “most of our conventional measures of
inequality” (Henry 2012, p. 40).
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Figure 3: Unrecorded assets as share of world GDP, 2001-2011
4.2 Allocation of hidden wealth
While the last section could shed only a little light on recent developments, the
data is much clearer when it comes to the allocation of hidden wealth. From
Figure 2 in the last section, we see that the total amount of unrecorded assets
located in tax havens are increasing for all years except 2008, when the financial
crisis emerged. Adjusted for economic growth, the amount of hidden wealth
– measured as percent of world GDP – in tax havens grew quite steadily until
reaching its peak at 4.9% in 2007, before it dropped in 2008, only to increase
again to 4.7% in 2009. From there, however, there is a steady decline of 0.3%
each year. Over the entire period, the development in unrecorded assets located
in tax havens is quite similar to the developments we see in the total hidden
wealth, but the decline in the later years is not as significant (Figure 3).
When I break the numbers down to country-level, the changes in the allo-
cation of unrecorded assets are a lot more conspicuous. In 2008, the biggest
tax havens in terms of total hidden wealth located in the country, were Luxem-
bourg, Cayman Islands, Ireland, France, Japan and Netherlands (in that order).
In 2011, only three years later, we find Ireland at the very top, followed by
Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, United States, Japan, Netherlands and United
Kingdom. Despite some rotation, the top three countries hosting the most un-
recorded assets, remain the same. These three countries, Ireland, Luxembourg
and Cayman Islands, all host large mutual fund industries, which means that
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Figure 4: Unrecorded assets located in selected countries, 2001-2011
a lot of this wealth is in turn reinvested elsewhere (Zucman 2013). This further
implies that we have not come any closer to identify who owns a large fraction
of the world’s fund-held asset holdings. The fact that the largest tax havens
have maintained their position could also serve as a supporting argument for
the scenario modeled by Elsayyad and Konrad (2012), where the tax havens
with the highest revenues are most resilient.
The developments for a few of these countries are remarkable, and are re-
ported in Figure 4. In particular, United States has gone from a “market share”
in hidden wealth at 4% in 2008, 2009 and 2010, to hosting 14% of the world’s
unrecorded assets in 2011. Ireland’s growth is similarly rapid - from a share
around 14% between 2005 and 2008, they have increased their share until host-
ing nearly a quarter of the worlds unrecorded assets in 2011. A similar, but less
extreme, pattern can be observed for the United Kingdom. As we have seen in
the previous section, the total amount of unrecorded assets has not increased to
such an extent, so there has to be some re-allocation of hidden assets between
countries. I try to investigate this by grouping countries into (1) United States
and United Kingdom, (2) OECD member countries, excluded United States,
United Kingdom and tax havens, (3) tax havens who are also members of the
OECD, namely Switzerland, Ireland and Luxembourg, and (4) other tax havens,
mostly small offshore financial centers (OFCs). Before I compare the groups, I
take a brief look at the tax havens within OECD’s own ranks: Switzerland, Ire-
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land and Luxembourg.
Switzerland has historically been the tax haven of tax havens, at least by
reputation. Consequently, the swiss wealth management has been reported to
be under “intense pressure” by other countries, who are “pushing Switzerland
into a financial identity crisis” (IBTimes, 2014). Switzerland has to some extent
given in to the pressure. It ranks high on the list of cooperating tax havens,
having signed at least 18 tax information treaties, only beaten by Malta (I will
come back to these statistics in the next subsection). According to a financial
leader, cited in IBTimes (2014), this has led “several foreign banks to exit the
Swiss market due to increased regulation and the costs associated with it”. The
data supports this claim. Over the eleven years of the dataset, the unrecorded
assets located in Switzerland has declined significantly both in relative and ab-
solute terms, from hosting 5% of the total unrecorded assets in 2001, to hosting
below 1% in 2011. What is curious, however, is that many of the same character-
izations could apply to Luxembourg and Ireland, also in terms of cooperation,
but the trend in unrecorded assets in these countries is quite the opposite of
Switzerland. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 5. Being a galleon figure for
bank secrecy may have turned against Switzerland, allowing other countries,
apparently similar to them, to remain under the radar and attract foreign capi-
tal. While the causal effects are not analyzed in this thesis, it is still important to
bear in mind that the increase in hidden wealth located in these three countries
is not driven by Switzerland, but rather Luxembourg and Ireland.
I now return to the groupings made two paragraphs above. I calculate the
joint share of unrecorded assets within each group to the total amount of un-
recorded assets. The results are shown in Figure 6. While the United States
and the United Kingdom have increased their share significantly, but bumpily,
after 2008, the OECD countries have decreased their share almost accordingly
to US and UK’s growth. This pattern is visible throughout almost all eleven
years, with the graphs more or less mirroring each other. The decline in the
OECD group is not driven by one single country, as large, European economies
all seem to suffer a significant decline. France alone have lost almost $330 bil-
lions worth of unrecorded assets, while Italy, Spain and Netherlands also have a
large negative growth rate over the three years. For the group of non-OECD tax
havens, it is hard to draw any conclusions. Since 2006, their share suffers some
fluctuations, but remains within the range of 15-22%. The group of tax havens
within the OECD, however, seems to be winning in the battle for unrecorded
capital. Led by Ireland, the group has increased their share from about one
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Figure 5: Unrecorded assets located in Switzerland, Ireland and Luxembourg
third in 2007, to nearly half of the world’s unrecorded assets in 2011.
It should not come as a big surprise that these countries attract hidden
wealth, both being veterans in the tax haven-business. It is baffling, however,
that the hidden wealth OECD so desperately wants to unveil, is located among
their own members. Even more baffling, is the increase in the figures for the
United States and the United Kingdom - two outspoken opponents of tax haven
practices.
First of all, the estimates for these countries are not subject to much adjust-
ments in the estimation for hidden wealth, as they both participate in the CPIS
and are included in the updated and extended version of the EWNII-dataset
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). In fact, the adjustments made
for other countries in Section 3, affects only the derived asset side A ji in the cal-
culation of the unrecorded assets Ω j = Lˆ j − ∑i 6= j Aˆi j, thus making the hidden
wealth estimate smaller than if no corrections were made. So, in the methodical
framework used in this thesis, these particular estimates should be considered
reliable.
The results stand in sharp contrast to the role especially the US has taken
in the international battle against tax havens. Rhetorically, president Barack
Obama has attacked the tax havens by several occasions.15 But also in terms of
15See for instance Calmes and Andrews (2009) and Murphy (2014)
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Figure 6: Unrecorded asset share, grouped countries, 2001-2011
actual efforts, the US has been in front. By implementing the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), labeled “an outstanding piece of legislation” by
the organization Tax Justice Network (TJN), USA lays pressure on foreign banks
to report American citizens’ holdings abroad (TJN 2012).16 As of May 2015,
a total of 112 jurisdictions have signed intergovernmental agreements (IGAs)
with the United States following FATCA, implementing the act into their own
legal systems (US Treasury 2015).
Making progress internationally, the United States still seems to have prob-
lems domestically which can contribute to the understanding of the hidden
wealth estimates. One particular issue is the state of Delaware, which allows
individuals to set up corporations without disclosing ownership. The address
1209 North Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, for instance, is the legal
address for over 285 000 businesses, and the state has been pointed out as a
thriving tax haven by both media and activists (NY Times 2012; Tax Justice
Blog 2013). The New York Times quotes the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, a division of the United States Treasury Department, when stating
that Delaware, along with states Nevada, Wyoming and Oregon are “particu-
larly appealing” for the formation of shell companies. Also, the FATCA only
requires information about US citizens abroad – not the other way around, so
the United States presumably has everything needed to function as a tax haven.
16My translation.
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A similar argument can be made about the United Kingdom, where the City of
London acts as the tax haven within the country (Palan et. al. 2010). Knowing
this, the development in unrecorded assets may not appear so unrealistic after
all.
I would like to emphasize that no causal conclusions can be drawn from
these estimates. Being exactly that – estimates – and given that they are quite
close to the truth, they only tell us where the unrecorded assets have been lo-
cated over eleven years. With that being said, I conclude this section by point-
ing out that in the last years, parallel to the aftermath of the financial crisis and
the beginning of a collective effort to eradicate tax havens, the total amount
of unrecorded assets appear to have increased less than the general economic
growth. In terms of allocation, unrecorded asset levels remained roughly the
same in small offshore financial centers, declined in non-haven OECD coun-
tries and Switzerland, while increasing significantly in Ireland, Luxembourg,
the United States and the United Kingdom. This is hardly in line with one of
the implications in Slemrod and Wilson’s (2009) model presented in Section 2.2,
where it is implied that in the case of partial elimination, the largest havens will
give up their practice first.
4.3 The treaty effect
The time-series of unrecorded assets and its allocation created in the previous
section is useful, but do not provide any evidence of causality. I will now look
more into the treaties that have been signed, vividly illustrated in Figure 1.
First, I create two groups: The most cooperative tax havens, and the least co-
operative tax havens. I categorize them by counting the number of treaties
signed with non-havens, based on the dataset created by Zucman and Johan-
nesen (2014). The top five is Malta (26 treaties), San Marino (18), Cyprus (18),
Luxembourg (18) and Switzerland (18). On the other side of the list, we have
Macao (1), Costa Rica (1), Seychelles (2), Barbados (6) and Uruguay (6). Look-
ing at Figure 8, bearing in mind that most treaties were signed in 2009 and 2010,
it is not possible to tell whether they have had any effect, even if the increas-
ing trend gets a bit jagged after 2007 for the cooperation countries. One reason
for this, is that the least cooperative havens host very small, practically zero,
amounts of unrecorded assets, making them ineligible as a comparison group.
Hence, more sophisticated methods are needed.
To see which effect, if any, these treaties have had on asset holdings, I re-
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Figure 7: Unrecorded asset, grouped by cooperation, 2001-2011
turn to the raw CPIS-dataset, before any adjustments or predictions were made.
I add three dummy variables, namely Treatyendorsedi jt, Treatysignedi jt, and
Treatyen f orcedi jt. As the three definitively are correlated and could affect as-
set holdings, I include all three to avoid omitted variable bias. By including
three correlated predictor variables, there will be some multicollinearity in the
regression, possibly causing large standard errors. This could in turn cause
that statistically significant coefficients are reported not significant. However,
as seen in Table 2, most coefficients are significant, so I do not pursue this issue
much further.
While the treaty data is broken down to quarters, the CPIS data is not.
Hence, these dummies change from 0 to 1 if and only if a treaty is endorsed,
signed or enforced the year before. That is, they equal 1 the first whole year
when a treaty is existing and all years after. This is in line with what Zucman
and Johannesen (2014) found in their analysis: The effects of a treaty are best
noticed three or four quarters after the signing. I limit the analysis to holdings
by non-havens, in tax havens.
I run two different regression models, and the analyses are separate for debt
and equities. First, I extend the gravity-like model from section 3, by including
the new dummies. The complete model reads
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log(1+Ai jt) = φ j +θt +βi jtZi jt +γitXit +Endorsedi jt + Signedi jt +En f orcedi jt +εi jt.
(10)
For further details of this model, see Section 3.2.1.
The second model is taken from Zucman and Johannesen (2014). Instead
of using bilateral controls, it controls for all time invariant characteristics of
country-pair through country-pair fixed effects, λi j as well as all common time
trends through time fixed effects, µt. The dependent variable is the log of assets,
as in the gravity-like model. The full fixed-effects model reads
log(1+ Ai jt) = α+µt + λi j +β1Endorsedi jt +β2Signedi jt +β3En f orcedi jt +εi jt.
(11)
The results are reported in Table 2, and both models tell the opposite story of
Zucman and Johannesen’s (2014) analysis on bank deposits. While they show
that the signing of a treaty causes capital owners to shift away from the in-
volved tax haven, the CPIS data implies that asset owners shift towards a tax
haven when it involves itself in a tax treaty. I find that the actual enforcement of
the treaties has the biggest effect. According to the fixed effects model, enforc-
ing a treaty causes a 40% increase in equity holdings from non-haven countries,
and an increase of 34% for debt holdings. The coefficients are even larger in
the gravity-like model. These positive effects are also to be found for endorse-
ment and signing of treaties, but for debt assets the effect is ambiguous in the
fixed effects model. The coefficients are slightly larger, but still quite similar
both in size and significance when estimated separately for the three dummies,
controlling for multicollinearity. However, these coefficients are likely to be
overestimated due to omitted variable bias (see Table 8 in Section A.6 in the
appendix).
There are a few possible explanations for these results. First of all, these are
not effects on hidden wealth, these are effects on what might be perfectly legal
cross-country asset holdings. We saw in the last section that the hidden wealth
located in tax havens has not increased to an extent corresponding to the results
of these regressions. This implies at least one plausible explanation: A treaty
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stimulates investments by improving the particular tax haven’s reputation. Af-
ter all, a tax haven is rarely only a tax haven. For instance, the financial center
of Curacao, the largest island in the former Netherlands Antilles, attracts busi-
nesses with “infrastructure, highly qualified personnel, friendly fiscal climate,
multi-lingual background and strategic location” (CIFA 2015). Any business
with a reputation of high moral standards, may find treaty-signing tax havens
a lot more attractive than the uncooperative ones. This also has one very in-
teresting implication: Tax havens could be better off signing treaties, even if it
leads to less facilitation of tax evasion and secrecy activities, which has been
their trademark so far.
Then again, these havens could still play an important role in the scheme
of tax evasion, even if the actual hidden assets are located elsewhere. So-called
“round-tripping” methods of tax evasion are not uncommon. In these schemes,
individuals hide funds in tax havens and then reinvest those funds in stocks
and bonds in their home country. As we have seen, while hidden wealth lo-
cated in some tax havens has decreased, it has increased in other countries,
which could match an explanation of round-tripping tax evasion. However,
this is not supported in the existing research. Michelle Hanlon, Edward L.
Maydew and Jacob R. Thornock (2015) have recently studied the correlation
between US tax treaties and inbound portfolio investments (to USA) from the
cooperating havens, concluding that engaging in a treaty with a tax haven re-
sults in a decrease in both debt and equity investment from those havens. The
effect is quite significant, ranging from 20.6% to 32.6% for equities and zero to
32.5% for debt (Hanlon et. al. 2015). Taking this into consideration, the results
of the regressions might actually imply a shift towards more legal activities for
tax havens, and if we assume that more asset holdings within the entities yields
increased utility, they could be better off signing than not signing.
Another possible explanation is that these treaties cause a shift in the coun-
tries’ reporting, causing that the variation captured in the models is not entirely
from the actual asset holdings. As the data is from the CPIS, all figures are
reported by the source-countries, which in this sample means non-haven coun-
tries. Signing a treaty could improve the preciseness of the reported figures, and
if the assets previously were consistently underreported, it could explain some
of the apparent, and thus exaggerated, positive effect of tax treaties. It sounds
fairly reasonable that some tax havens would want to under-report the foreign
holdings in their banks, and if the non-havens’ reporting is a result of coop-
eration with the tax havens, signing a tax treaty is very likely to improve this
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Table 2:
Fixed effects model Gravity-like model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity assets, log Debt assets, log Equity assets, log Debt assets, log
Treaty endorsed 0.205∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(4.80) (2.63) (3.30) (4.24)
Treaty signed 0.195∗∗∗ 0.0593 0.427∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(3.94) (1.15) (4.63) (3.19)
Treaty enforced 0.403∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗
(5.29) (4.22) (4.54) (2.85)
Constant term -193.4∗∗∗ -139.2∗∗∗ -7.073∗∗∗ -3.036∗∗∗
(-23.56) (-16.45) (-19.92) (-8.82)
Source country controls No No Yes Yes
Bilateral controls No No Yes Yes
Host country fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Country-pair fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12980 13075 12491 12556
R2 0.927 0.915 0.654 0.637
adj. R2 0.914 0.900 0.653 0.636
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
cooperation. However, if the non-havens reporting is based solely on their own
controlling of outgoing money flows, the reported figures may not be affected
to the same extent. All in all, I do not find this possibility evident enough – as
far as I know, the source-countries could also have over-reported prior to the
tax treaty – but one should keep in mind that these regressions strictly speaking
only show significant effects on the reported asset holdings.
5 Concluding remarks
In the introduction, I presented my three research questions. These were: How
the massive efforts against tax havens have affected the total amount of hidden
wealth, how the allocation of hidden wealth has been affected, and how do
the treaties signed affect asset holdings in tax havens. I have estimated figures
of unrecorded assets to answer the two first questions, and used two different
regression models to answer the last.
My estimates for total hidden wealth lend some support to OECD’s claim
that we are approaching the end of the era of bank secrecy. While the ab-
solute value of unrecorded assets has stabilized, albeit on a high level, the
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growth-adjusted numbers have a quite significant negative trend. A smaller
and smaller share of the world’s GDP goes unrecorded.
The allocation of unrecorded assets appear to undergo some changes. While
Ireland has increased their share of hidden wealth constantly since 2007, the
OECD countries not listed as tax havens and not including the United States
and the United Kingdom, have lost shares constantly since 2008. The US and
the UK seem to attract a lot of unrecorded assets in the very last period, 2011,
while the share of tax havens fluctuates, but does not seem to change signifi-
cantly. For the OECD, this could be both good and bad news. The growth of
hidden wealth in tax havens has halted, which could imply that their efforts
have had an impact. What must be addressed further, is the wealth hidden
within the OECD’s own ranks. It seems to have some success with Switzer-
land, where the unrecorded asset holdings have decreased for many years, but
there are still enormous amounts hidden in Ireland, Luxembourg, the US and
the UK, implying that only a partial elimination seems realistic in the short run.
However, we have seen in Slemrod and Wilson’s (2009) model, that this could
be sufficient to increase welfare.
To summarize, there are certainly some good news for the OECD in its battle
against tax evasion, even if new challenges arise. But in theory, initial success
does not necessarily mean ultimate success, as the model created by Elsayyad
and Konrad (2012) and presented in Section 2, evidently shows. However, the
asset holdings in tax havens, regardless of their legal status, appear to increase
when a tax treaty is signed. I discussed the possible reasons for this in the
previous section. This means that tax havens can actually profit from signing a
tax treaty, attracting more legal capital. If this holds true, tax havens may not
be as resilient as Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) assume – even if the largest tax
havens do not appear to be eradicated any time soon.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional figure to section 3.2.2: Benchmark regression,
comparison of periods
Table 3: P-values from the Wald tests
* = Significantly different at the 1% level.
Not sign. = The coefficient compared is not significant at the 5% level.
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A.2 Detailed discussion of the collection of asset data
A.2.1 Netherlands Antilles
The Netherlands Antilles was dissolved in October 2010, which resulted in a
new constitutional grouping. The islands of Curacao and Sint Maarten gained
autonomy under the Kingdom of The Netherlands, while Bonaire, Sint Eu-
statius and Saba became special municipalities of the Netherlands. Because
of this, CPIS-reporting of assets in the Netherlands Antilles is discontinued in
2009. After that the dataset is rather inconsistent; some CPIS-participants have
reported assets held in Curacao, some in Sint Maarten, and some in Curacao &
Sint Maarten, as well as Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. As I want to look at
developments in hidden wealth, and the Netherlands Antilles being an impor-
tant tax haven (both before and after the disintegration), I still want to obtain
figures for the Netherlands Antilles as a whole. Thus, I sum the assets for all
host countries that formerly were a part of the Netherlands Antilles, and treat
them as if it never was dissolved.
In some cases, when a source country reports some value of assets in all the
relevant jurisdictions, this is straight forward and unproblematic. However, in
most cases some of the entries are missing, and by using this method I implic-
itly assume that all missing values are equal to zero, which may not necessarily
be true. Ideally I would collect values for all control variables and predict the
missing values, and add the values together afterwards. Unfortunately, this
would be a rather complicated exercise, as countries report inconsequently to
Curacao, Sint Maarten and them both combined. In addition, the US TIC sur-
vey, which I use for to estimates liabilities for the Netherlands Antilles, do not
provide any breakdown to Curacao, Sint Maarten or the others.
I choose to proceed by adding together the values before any predictions
were made, knowing that the asset holdings of Netherlands Antilles may be
somewhat underestimated.
A.2.2 Cayman Islands and the TIC data
The Cayman Islands participate in the CPIS, but unfortunately they do not in-
clude their non-bank sector, which is very large. According to the German
paper Der Spiegel, paraphrased by the Norwegian online newspaper E24, 89
percent of the worlds hedge funds are located in the Cayman Islands. In other
words, this should not be neglected (Sjoelie and Ekeberg 2009).
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Gabriel Zucman (2013) addresses the same problem, and I follow his proce-
dure almost every step of the way. First, I collect data on Cayman holdings in
the USA from the TIC survey. Unlike Zucman (2013), who takes his TIC data
from a set of monthly estimates conducted by Bertaut and Tryon (2007), I use
data directly from the TIC database, which is conducted in June each year. To
obtain year-end data, like in the CPIS, I simply take the average of June in the
same year and June in the following year.
I check the consistency of this method by calculating estimates for 2006,
2007 and 2008 and comparing them with the estimates used by Gabriel Zuc-
man (2013). The two estimates are not exactly similar, but the deviations are
not alarming and they follow the same pattern over the years. For instance,
Zucman’s estimates for debt assets are 426 billion dollars in 2006, 523 in 2007
and 493 in 2008. My corresponding estimates are 389 billion dollars in 2006,
494 in 2007 and 487 in 2008, which is consistently a bit below Zucman’s (2013)
numbers, but overall it seems like they follow the same trend. Either way, as
the monthly estimates by Bertaut and Tryon (2007) do not cover all needed peri-
ods, I consider these estimates best guesses and use them to correct the reported
asset holdings by the Cayman Islands.
To distribute the holdings across host countries, I first calculate the total as-
set holdings, ECI and DCI of Cayman Islands, using the sharesσECI,US andσ
D
CI,US
(I implicitly assume that the investments from the non-bank sector follows the
same pattern as the bank sector investment reported to the CPIS). Next, I dis-
tribute the calculated sum of assets across host countries using the calculated
shares.17
A.2.3 China
China do not participate in either the CPIS or the Survey of Securities Held
as Foreign Exchange Reserves (SEFER), which is included as one entry in the
CPIS. Thus, China’s holdings of foreign assets are not in the dataset at all, and
because of the large share of public investments in the Chinese portfolio, this
must be carefully accounted for. Again I follow Gabriel Zucman’s (2013) lead
in correcting the numbers, but encounter some problems that need to be ad-
dressed.
For public holdings, I collect data on official foreign exchange assets from
17This procedure is the exact same as Gabriel Zucman (2013) uses. For Cayman Islands, the
only deviation from the method in his paper is the collection of TIC data
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the International Foreign Statistics (IFS), available from the IMF database. For
consistency, I use Zucman’s “best-guess” and assume that 85 percent of China’s
foreign exchange reserves are invested in securities. This 85 percent figure
“tries to catch a balance” between a scenario presented by Philip D. Wooldridge
(2006), where a share of 97 percent is shown using BIS data, and a thought sce-
nario where the BIS data is somewhat biased and the share is much smaller
(Zucman 2013a, p. 22-23).
For non-reserve assets, I collect data on both equity and debt holdings from
IMF’s International Investment Position (IIP). Additionally, I collect data on
Chinese debt and equity holdings in USA from the TIC survey data, and use
this to derive the share of equity holdings in the US. I apply this share on the
sum of all foreign holdings (public + private), to obtain estimates for total Chi-
nese equity holdings and total Chinese debt holdings (that is EˆChina and DˆChina).
There is one concern connected to setting the US share of equities equal to
the global share of equities, namely that China dropped around 97 percent of
its holdings of short-term US debt from December 2008 to December 2010. This
has in turn led to an increase in the equity share from 5 percent in 2008 to 11
percent in 2011 (see Table 4). Now, the key question is how China has rein-
vested their funds after they dropped US short term debt: Have they bought
short term debt issued by another country, yielding an unchanged global eq-
uity share, or have they invested more or less equally in debt and equities? Or
is the divestment of US debt simply a sign of a change in investment strategy
towards more equity investment, away from debt? I have no clear answer, but
looking into the IIP figures may give some hints. For non-reserve assets, the
share of equity holdings has skyrocketed from 7 percent in 2007 to 42 percent
in 2011. Looking at the estimates provided in Lane and Milesi-Ferrettis EWNII-
dataset, I observe the same pattern; an increase from 21 to 56 percent. So, it
looks like an increase in the Chinese total share of equity holdings could make
sense.
Assuming the opposite – an unchanged equity/debt-ratio at 6 percent (the
approximate average before the Chinese dumping of US debt holdings) – I get
nonsensical figures, with a higher figure for Chinese equity holdings in USA
than the total sum of Chinese equity holdings in USA and the rest of the world
combined (compare lines 16 and 12 in Table 4). All things considered, I stick
with Zucman’s (2013) recipe and apply the TIC-derived share of equities to the
global sum of Chinese assets.
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Table 4: Collected data, China
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Figure 8: Short term/long term ratio
A.2.4 Middle eastern oil exporters (MEOE)
Out of the oil exporters in the Middle East, namely Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Oman Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, only Bahrain and
Kuwait participate in the CPIS. In MEOE’s accumulation of foreign claims,
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) plays an important role. SWFs are publicly
controlled funds investing budgetary and extra-budgetary savings (The Nor-
wegian Pension Fund is the worlds biggest SWF), and thus the general method
can not be used. I use TIC data to correct this, but unfortunately, there is no
national breakdown other than "Middle Eastern Oil Exporters" available. As
other data on Middle Eastern Oil Exporters are scarce, I proceed by treating
them all as one unit. The method are pretty straight forward as described in
section 3.2.1.; that is, I estimate MEOE’s total asset holdings using (1) TIC data
on assets held in the US and (2) the expected share of holdings in the US in
MEOE’s portfolio.
The TIC data provides us with data on both equity holdings and long-term
debt holdings, but the values on short-term holdings cannot be used, as it don’t
disentangle between different kinds of claims (Zucman 2013a). I deal with this
the same way as Gabriel Zucman (2013), by assuming a short-term/long-term
ratio equal to the average short-term/long-term ratio for all foreign holdings
of US securities. However, as I use a different TIC source than Zucman, I get
a consistently lower ratio than he does also when I calculate it for the years
45
in his data. Which estimate that is the right one I leave unanswered, but as
he uses an adjusted version of the TIC survey, I expect that the discrepancy is
due to some adjustments made by Bertaut and Tryon (2007). Nevertheless, the
different estimates seem to follow the same trend, especially for the latter years.
To maintain internal consistency in the dataset, I adjust my estimate slightly
upwards to match Zucman’s (2013), as seen in Figure 8.
To get from the estimate on MEOE’s asset holdings in USA to MEOE’s total
asset holdings, I need to estimate the share of US holdings in MEOE’s inter-
national portfolio. Zucman (2013) derives this from existing literature. He as-
sumes a 70 percent share in 2001, and then a annual decline of 2 percent. I do not
challenge this, hence I assume a share of 54 percent in 2009, 52 percent in 2010
and 50 percent in 2011. According to Zucman (2013a, p 27), assuming that only
half of the MEOE portfolio is invested in the US in the recent years “matches the
most recent estimates and various back-of-the-envelope computations". Now, I
have all the data needed to compute EˆMEOE and DˆMEOE (numbers reported in
line 18, 19 and 20 in Table 5). I subtract the numbers reported by Kuwait and
Bahrain, and distribute the holdings across host countries using the predicted
shares σMEOE, j.
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Table 5: Collected data, Middle Eastern Oil Exporters
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A.2.5 Netherlands
A simple correction must also be done in the case of the Netherlands. They
report to the CPIS, but do not include their Special Financial Institutions (SFIs).
These are “resident Dutch enterprises or institutions, fully owned by foreign
direct investors, that act as financial intermediary between other parts of the
group to which they belong” (De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), 2014). Data on
both debt holdings and equity holdings for the Netherlands SFIs are available
from DNB – in euros. I convert the values to US dollars using the year-end cur-
rency rate from each year, and obtain values that seem consistent with Gabriel
Zucman’s (2013) numbers; my method yields SFI equity holdings of 18731 mil-
lion USD in 2008, while Zucman (2013) reports 21706 million USD. For debt
holdings, I get 62497 mill. USD in 2008, while Zucman (2013) reports 62910
mill. USD. As the difference between the equity figures are a lot bigger than
between the debt figures, the differences can not entirely be explained by dif-
ferent currency rates (I don’t know which rate Zucman has used), so my best
guess is that the numbers have been slightly adjusted over the years.
I consider the differences negligible, and use my numbers as they are. The
procedure is nevertheless similar to what Zucman (2013) describes in his On-
line Appendix, and as with every issue, I strive to replicate his method for the
dataset to be consistent over all 11 years (Zucman 2013a). Hence, I add the SFI
holdings to the Netherlands total asset holdings, and distribute the sum across
host countries using the predicted shares (as usual).
A.2.6 Others
Some countries do not participate in the CPIS all years. For the years Zuc-
man (2013) estimates, 2001-2008, this applies to Bahrain, Barbados, Gibraltar,
India, Kuwait , Latvia and Mexico, and is nothing I need to worry about as it
is already corrected. In the years I estimate, 2009-2011, Bolivia (2011), Mongo-
lia (2011), Lithuania (2009) and Slovenia (2008) joined the CPIS. This gives me
the opportunity to estimate their holdings more precisely than the gravity-like
model. I fill in the gaps by calculating the different countries’ share in the to-
tal sum of CPIS-reported assets for the first year they participate. I then obtain
their estimated total asset holdings by applying this share to the total sum of
CPIS-reported assets the years they do not participate.
For those countries not participating in the CPIS at all, total asset holdings
are estimated individually for private assets and public assets (reserve hold-
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ings). The data source are mainly the updated and extended version of the
dataset (EWNII) constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for private as-
sets, supplemented by raw CPIS-derived numbers. For public assets, the main
data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) reported to the IMF.
As I don’t deviate from Gabriel Zucman’s procedure at all on this point, but
simply collect the relevant data, I refer the reader to Zucman’s (2013a) excellent
Online Appendix for further details on the calculations.18
A.2.7 Unallocated claims and the residual
Just as Zucman (2013), I allocate unallocated and confidential claims (which
is an independent entry in the CPIS) across the bilateral entries which is either
equal to zero or missing in the original CPIS set. They are distributed according
to the predicted shares. I also use this method to allocate the residual from the
predicted values, which I obtain by taking the difference between the source-
level aggregates and the total claims plus the unallocated claims. For further
details, see Zucman’s online appendix (2013a).
A.3 Detailed discussion of the collection of liability data
In the collection of liability data, I follow Gabriel Zucman’s (2013) methods
without deviations. Thus, the process described below is entirely adopted from
him.
A.3.1 Small offshore financial centers (OFCs)
To obtain estimates on the small OFC’s liabilities, I collect data individually for
fund-sector and non-fund-sector equities. For the latter, I use data from the
TIC survey. This only gives a lower bound, which is hard to tell whether is
close to the truth or not. Gabriel Zucman assumes that the “Cayman non-fund
liabilities are simply equal to the US non-fund equity assets on the Caymans”,
so for the time series to be consistent, so do I (Zucman 2013a, p. 43).
For data on fund-sector equities, I use various sources. For Cayman Islands,
I use Investment Digests, published by Cayman Islands Monetary Authority
(CIMA) yearly. For Bermuda, I use various issues of Bermuda Monetary Au-
thority’s (BMA) Reports and Accounts, and for Liechtenstein I use the 2012 edi-
tion of the Annual Report of Liechtenstein’s Financial Market Authority (FMA 2013).
18More precisely: Pages 31-34 in the Online Appendix (Zucman 2013a)
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For Jersey, Guernsey and the Netherlands Antilles, I collect data on fund-sector
equities from the sectoral breakdown of portfolio assets reported in Table 3 of
the CPIS (2015).
The final estimate of the small OFC’s equity liabilities, is computed as max(fund
liabilities plus non-fund liabilities; creditor-derived equity liabilities), whereas
the second argument is the sum of all source countries’ equity holdings in the
particular country, derived from the CPIS dataset.
For debt liabilities, I use data from the Bank of International Settlements’
(BIS) Quarterly Review (June 2012, Table 11). As with equities, the final estimate
for debt liabilities is calculated as max (BIS-derived debt liabilities; creditor-
derived debt liabilities from the CPIS).
A.3.2 International organizations and Netherlands SFIs
International organizations are also missing in the EWNII-dataset. I collect data
on debt liabilites from BIS, as in the previous section, and use creditor-derived
figures for equity liabilities.
As for the asset data, the Special Financial Institutions (SFIs) are excluded
when estimates for Netherlands are calculated. I correct this just as I did with
the assets: I go to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), which provides SFI break-
down in its International Investment Position (IIP) data, and add these numbers
to the figures in the CPIS.
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A.4 Additional figure to Section 4.1: Developments in hidden
wealth
Figure 9: Unrecorded assets as share of next year’s GDP
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A.6 Additional table to Section 4.3: The treaty effect
Table 8: The fixed effects model estimated separately for Treaty endorsed, Treaty signed and
Treaty en f orced.
Debt assets, log Equity assets, log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treaty endorsed 0.145∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗
(3.30) (6.15)
Treaty signed 0.174∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(3.77) (7.74)
Treaty enforced 0.397∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(5.43) (8.01)
Constant term -147.6∗∗∗ -147.0∗∗∗ -147.9∗∗∗ -209.5∗∗∗ -206.3∗∗∗ -213.0∗∗∗
(-17.95) (-17.96) (-18.59) (-26.26) (-26.00) (-27.64)
Country-pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13075 13075 13075 12980 12980 12980
R2 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.926 0.926 0.926
adj. R2 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.914 0.914 0.914
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
A.7 Data sets and .do-files
All calculations and analyses are performed using STATA. Data files (.dta) and .do-files used
in this thesis are available upon request. Any inquiries should be directed to haakonrh@gmail.com.
68
